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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

22 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH: Chairman, National Intelligence Council

FROM:
Acting National Intelligence Officer for Latin America

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SUBJECT: Sandinista Posture on Negotiations

1. Attached are various Intelligence Community and CIA assessments of the Sandinista attitude toward negotiations as well as recent intelligence reports relevant to the Shultz trip to Managua.

2. In general, the Intelligence Community believes the Sandinistas regard negotiations primarily as a tactic to ease external pressures and buy time for their own revolutionary consolidation. They are not likely to make concessions on democratization which would endanger their internal control, and even if they temporarily agreed to stop aiding the Salvadoran insurgents, they would resume support when conditions were favorable. (See Tab A)

3. There is also considerable evidence that the Cubans are skeptical of US intentions and are advising the Sandinistas accordingly. Meanwhile, they are preparing for the worst and assisting Managua in doing likewise. The Sandinista's themselves are portraying the Shultz visit as a propaganda effort to save the contras, and they are telling us that unilateral concessions are out of the question. (See Tab B)

4. One of the major dangers of the talks is that the Sandinistas will attempt to establish private contacts which they may then reveal to other countries in the region with the claim the US is attempting to sell them out. This is a tactic the Cubans used against Haig in 1982. Managua has always sought bilateral talks and agreements as a means of dividing the opposition. They are attempting to establish private contacts with the Honduran military, and have already held talks with sympathetic Costa Rican officials in an attempt to get them to alter government policy toward the Sandinistas. (See Tab C)

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NIE 83.3-83:
NICARAGUA:
THE OUTLOOK FOR THE INSURGENCY
30 June 1983

Excerpts from: Key Judgments

The present level and focus of insurgent activity are not likely to influence the Sandinistas to make significant domestic or foreign policy changes. Because of the depth of the Sandinista leaders' ideological commitment, their experiences in adversity during many years as anti-Somoza guerrillas, and the strong backing they receive from Communist countries, we believe the chances are quite small that they would back down. Thus, there would probably be little practical difference in the level and quality of insurgency activity that would be sufficient to severely destabilize the regime, to force significant domestic policy changes, or to force it to reduce its commitment to promote revolutionary change elsewhere in Central America. Accordingly, requirements for external support would be similar in all three cases. This does not preclude the possibility that the Sandinistas might suggest a deceptive agreement to stop supporting the Salvadoran guerrillas in exchange for a US commitment to withdraw support from the Nicaraguan insurgents.

Excerpts from: Discussion

Pressuring the Regime: Sandinista leaders are committed revolutionaries who endured hardship in their long struggle for power and are prepared to continue doing so in order to retain it. They have refused to compromise their revolutionary principles and have made concessions to opponents only in those instances when repression generated a popular backlash and undercut the regime's legitimacy. Even then, however, the concessions were temporary, usually nothing more than a tactic to buy time. As long as the regime can count on Soviet and Cuban backing, a major alteration in policy is not likely, although Sandinista leaders may periodically feign an interest in dialogue or negotiations for their tactical and propaganda value.

If the insurgents were intent on pressuring the regime to change domestic or foreign policies, they would have to threaten Sandinista control seriously and generate greater popular opposition. It is important to note, however, that this would entail virtually the same strategy as the one discussed above to destabilize the regime severely. In the unlikely event the Sandinistas could be cowed into making meaningful concessions, the insurgents would need a coordinated negotiating strategy and agreement on their future course of action after negotiations.

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Interagency Vulnerability Assessment
22 June 1984

NICARAGUA:
THE STATUS OF THE INSURGENCY

Excerpts from: Overview

We expect the Sandinistas to continue to feel an incentive to negotiate as long as the pressure is on them. There is one clear limit to this: they are unlikely to conduct serious negotiations with foreign governments concerning democratization if that--or any other fundamental yielding on their part--would mean their losing control of Nicaragua. Nevertheless, they may well relax repression temporarily, particularly in the time leading up to the planned elections in 1985. [REDACTED]

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On matters of less direct concern to the Sandinistas, gestures on their part that the United States would like to see translated into action might lead the Sandinistas to ask for a similar concession from other powers. For example, if Washington asked that all foreign advisers leave Nicaragua, Managua probably would insist on the departure of US advisers from neighboring countries. [REDACTED]

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The major question concerning Sandinista offers to negotiate is whether the Sandinistas are making concessions for tactical reasons or whether they would seriously agree to a permanent settlement. Serious intent to negotiate on the part of the Sandinistas would be indicated if they approach the United States through diplomatic channels rather than working in the public, propaganda forum. In the event that the United States took the initiative by using diplomatic channels to ask for tangible evidence of the seriousness of intent to negotiate, such as the departure of Cuban or other Communist military personnel or the cessation of Salvadoran communications from Nicaragua, this would serve to test the Sandinistas and probably generate some dissent within the Directorate. [REDACTED]

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If the Sandinistas were to make a serious gesture toward meeting the demands of others without receiving in return a relaxation of pressure or specific indications from the United States of what is wanted from Nicaragua, the Sandinista leaders might consider continued offers to

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negotiate to be useless. In that case, increased pressure might lead to renewed international support for the Sandinistas and lead them to tighten the screws at home, putting the democratic opposition in Nicaragua at a further disadvantage. [REDACTED]

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We believe that whatever negotiations ensue, the Sandinistas would not permanently abandon their commitment to revolution in Central America. They might stop the flow of arms and ammunition to El Salvador in an effort to reduce external pressures and remove a pretext for a US-supported invasion. However, they probably would resume the support--possibly at reduced levels--once their revolution seemed more firmly secure. [REDACTED]

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Special Analysis

CENTRAL AMERICA: The Contadora Negotiations

The Contadora talks recently marked their first anniversary, and, despite continued pessimism about chances for a comprehensive peace treaty, Mexico, Colombia, Venezuela, and Panama have managed to keep the process alive. At a meeting in Panama in early January, they persuaded the Central American states to agree to specific guidelines for further negotiations. Talks on treaty terms, however, are likely to be protracted. There are fundamental differences between Nicaragua and the other Central Americans over the issues of democratization and verification of agreements. Nevertheless, the Contadora countries probably will continue their pressure for a settlement.

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Spokesmen for the Contadora group claim that the negotiation process has been instrumental in preventing war. The talks have received widespread international support, which has helped to establish them as the only acceptable vehicle for peace efforts. No party can easily abandon them or appear to be hindering progress.

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After nine months of periodic meetings last year, the Central Americans in September agreed on a 21-point "Document of Objectives." In October Nicaragua seized the diplomatic initiative by proposing four treaties to implement the objectives, and in December it proposed three additional interim agreements. The Central American "Core Four"—Honduras, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala—concentrated on procedural suggestions, thereby allowing Nicaragua to remain in the limelight.

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Faced with mounting pressure to show results, the Contadora countries in late December put aside their own work on draft peace treaties and suggested a new meeting to set specific guidelines for future talks. The Core Four responded by preparing their own guidelines and a draft treaty to counter Nicaragua's efforts.

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The document approved at the joint Foreign Ministers' meeting in Panama early this month calls for an inventory of military troops, arms, and weapons; a census of foreign military advisers and timetable for their removal; and identification of insurgent groups and arms routes. The political provisions include a call for independent electoral bodies and election calendars. Three committees were formed, and they are to draft specific military, political, and economic proposals by 30 April.

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The Core Four countries succeeded in removing the Contadora group's call for an immediate arms freeze and in inserting the principle that there should be a regional military balance. They failed, however, in their attempts to strengthen the weaker Contadora guidelines on democracy and verification. [REDACTED]

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Nicaraguan Strategy

The Sandinistas have given priority to those security issues that will relieve military pressure on them, including prohibitions on foreign military bases, maneuvers, and support for insurgents. Nicaragua wants the Contadora states to verify compliance, but it seeks to give them only a vague mandate to monitor the agreement. [REDACTED]

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The Sandinistas repeatedly have stated that their domestic policies are not negotiable, and they probably will resist efforts to strengthen the Contadora guidelines on democracy. They have said that all political parties participating in the elections scheduled for next year have to respect the fundamental principles of the revolution. Nicaragua has already moved to preempt demands for international verification by slightly liberalizing domestic policy and by indicating that it would invite international observers of its own choosing to its elections. [REDACTED]

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In addition, the Sandinistas are likely to push in the Contadora talks for some recognition of the political status of the Salvadoran insurgents. For example, one of their proposed treaties calls for an end to foreign military support to both sides in El Salvador. [REDACTED]

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At the same time, Managua probably will continue to resist any efforts to draw parallels with the insurgency in Nicaragua. It would be likely to insist that the anti-Sandinista guerrillas have no internal support and deserve no recognition. [REDACTED]

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Core Four Strategy

The other Central Americans insist that all regional peace concerns be dealt with simultaneously in one consolidated treaty. They have more ambitious objectives than the Sandinistas, but they may have a weaker bargaining position to secure them. The unity of the four was strained in Panama—Guatemala did not sign the counterdocument—and it will be a key factor in determining their future prospects. [REDACTED]

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The four countries seek a regional balance of military forces—including Nicaragua's militia—which would require the Sandinistas to disarm. Although they would permit small numbers of foreign military advisers, they would want to insert treaty provisions governing Cuban

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civilian advisers who can be armed. They hope to put Nicaragua on the defensive by calling for Central American participation in on-site inspection for these areas of concern and for detecting illegal arms traffic. [REDACTED]

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Proposals by the Core Four on democracy are designed as a constraint on future Nicaraguan support for subversion. The Central Americans believe that, unless Nicaragua makes progress toward democracy, it cannot be trusted to honor any agreement. In Managua's view, however, the proposals strike at the character of the Sandinista state by making free elections and rights of political parties, unions, and the press subject to international supervision.

[REDACTED]

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Outlook

The Contadora countries want the talks to move rapidly, and they probably will continue to push the parties to come to an agreement. This pressure may favor Managua, because Mexico—driven by its desire to preserve the Sandinista regime and avoid US intervention—has worked closely with Nicaragua. Venezuela and Colombia have not consistently acted to counter Mexico's influence or to place heavy emphasis on democratic issues. [REDACTED]

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Despite this thrust for a firm agreement, the talks are likely to progress slowly. They may hit their first snag if Nicaragua understates the numbers of its arms, troops, and advisers in the inventory and census phase. Verification also is likely to be a key problem. [REDACTED]

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As a defensive tactic, Nicaragua probably will call attention to its own electoral process and argue that the Core Four's proposals for pluralism are unacceptable because they exceed Contadora guidelines. Managua also is likely to resist making any concessions for international supervision on internal issues. Moreover, the Sandinistas may renew their call for a US commitment to abide by the Contadora agreements. [REDACTED]

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SECRET**Special Analysis****NICARAGUA:****Revolution Under Stress**

The siege mentality of the Sandinistas is intensifying as a result of increasing insurgent attacks, domestic polarization, and economic difficulties. The US Embassy reports pessimism among Nicaraguan leaders, who fear the consequences of US hostility. There are no signs, however, of a collapse of the regime or of serious strains among the nine-member National Directorate, although the revolution appears to lack the vitality and confidence of earlier years.

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Domestic support for the regime seems to be weakening, partly because of popular dissatisfaction with shortages of consumer goods and with regime attacks on the church. Several protests by mothers of draftees and reports of desertions indicate continued resistance to the conscription law approved last fall. Few will risk such open defiance, but the Sandinista leaders' call for greater sacrifices have increased underlying levels of frustration even among the government's supporters.

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Junta Coordinator Daniel Ortega's speech to the opening session of the Council of State early this month stressed that the weakening economy is a particular concern. In contrast to his upbeat speech last year, this address contained virtually no positive news. Ortega said that economic policy had to be shifted from reconstruction to defense, and this would necessitate new taxes, a freeze on social welfare spending, and a possible cut in consumer subsidies. He also emphasized the state's willingness to nationalize companies that do not cooperate with Sandinista economic goals.

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Political Challenges

The regime sees the elections it has scheduled for November as a means to legitimize the revolution, increase foreign and domestic support, and marshal international coordination against foreign backers of the anti-Sandinista insurgents. The regime probably will permit minimum electoral freedoms, but it is limiting the opposition's opportunities through a restrictive electoral law and a compressed campaign period.

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Opposition parties have not been able to capitalize on discontent because they lack effective leaders, policies, and organizations. They have made bold demands for political freedom and say they will

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boycott the elections if these demands are not met. The Sandinistas realize that a boycott would taint the elections, and they probably will try to discredit the opposition if it carries out its threat. [REDACTED]

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The Catholic Church has become more politicized than ever and remains the most important bulwark against the government's attempt to impose its ideology. It has grown in strength and visible public support during the last year as it has challenged the government on education policy and conscription. The bishops outraged the regime with their recent pastoral letter calling for a national dialogue that would include the insurgents. More clashes are likely if the church endorses opposition positions on electoral freedom. [REDACTED]

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Meanwhile, the Sandinistas' election announcement and foreign criticism of the mining of Nicaraguan ports appear to have temporarily arrested a decline in their international support. On the other hand, they have not found concrete backing in the form of increased Western economic aid or new military assistance, which probably has added to their sense of isolation. [REDACTED]

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Insurgent Threat

Managua probably still believes it can contain the anti-Sandinista guerrillas, but its acknowledgment that the attacks could go on for years underscores the regime's concern about a long-term drain on the country's resources. The insurgents continue to expand their strength—they claim over 15,000—and the Sandinistas' admissions of their own losses indicate the war's mounting toll. Although the insurgent air and sea attacks since late last year have caused little damage, they add to Sandinista anxieties. [REDACTED]

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The government has responded by increasing its arms buildup, civil defense and militia mobilizations, and propaganda. It also has greatly expanded distribution of farm land and has put on trial a number of soldiers and officials accused of human rights abuses in an effort to strengthen its popular support. [REDACTED]

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The Sandinistas fail to recognize how their own activities foster popular assistance to the guerrillas. Their severe repression in areas of insurgent activity, in particular, has caused refugees to flee to neighboring countries. Although the government claims over 1,000 have returned or surrendered, it probably has inflated the number to suggest that its amnesty program is a success. [REDACTED]

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- The insurgents, however, still lack unity, and the threat they pose will remain limited until they can control territory of strategic value and begin operations in urban areas. They probably will continue to grow in numbers, scope of operations, and effectiveness as long as they are resupplied. [REDACTED]

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Prospects for Negotiation

The Sandinistas almost certainly are encouraged by their diplomatic successes in the UN and World Court over the mining of Nicaraguan ports, but conversations between US officials and Sandinista leaders suggest that the regime sees mounting problems in the future. This outlook would certainly change if the insurgents were to lose their external sources of resupply. Even if the insurgency were to collapse, however, the Sandinistas appear unlikely to liberalize their political system significantly. [REDACTED]

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Although Managua may make gestures to mollify the Contadora countries, it probably will not agree to major concessions on democratization and disarmament, which are key issues to the other Central American countries. [REDACTED]

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High-level Sandinista leaders have told the US Embassy that they would like to negotiate with Washington, but they rule out any unilateral concessions—including closure of the Salvadoran guerrilla command center near Managua. The nine commanders say that they are discussing an offer to the US of some limited reciprocal concessions. This would be difficult for them because they fear concessions would be considered a sign of weakness. Nevertheless, the government has hinted that 1,500 Cuban teachers will be sent home permanently in June and some of them may leave as a gesture of flexibility. [REDACTED]

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FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY FROM JOHN A. FERCH
 E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, CU, US
 SUBJ: THE CUBAN VIEW OF CUBAN/US RELATIONS -- NO EVIDENCE OF
 ACCOMMODATION TO "NEW REALITIES"
 1. (SE- ENTIRE TEXT)
 2. SUMMARY: THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS CONCLUDED BOTH
 THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL BE REELECTED AND THAT THERE IS
 NO POSSIBILITY OF ENGAGING THE ADMINISTRATION PRODUCTIVELY.
 THIS DOUBLE CONCLUSION LEAVES THEM HANGING IN A POLICY SENSE.
 WHILE THEY PROBABLY DECIDED TO INVITE REV. JACKSON TO CUBA
 IN ORDER TO CREATE A PRESS OPPORTUNITY FROM WHICH THEY MIGHT
 INFLUENCE US PUBLIC OPINION AND THUS INDIRECTLY CONSTRAIN
 THE ADMINISTRATION, THAT VISIT COULD BACKFIRE FROM THEIR
 PERSPECTIVE. PERHAPS WE CAN HELP BRING ABOUT THAT POSSIBILITY.
 THE CUBANS RECOGNIZE THAT THEY ARE FACING A NEW SITUATION
 IN EL SALVADOR IN THE WAKE OF DUARTE'S ELECTION BUT HAVE NOT
 YET BEEN ABLE TO ADMIT THE LOGICAL RESULTS OF THAT CONCLUSION.
 END SUMMARY.

3. THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT IS USUALLY ADEPT AT ADJUSTING
 ITS FOREIGN POLICIES TO ACCOMMODATE "NEW RAALITIES". THEY ARE

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MASTERS OF DEFENDING THEIR POSITIONS WITH THE TWO STEPS FORWARD, ONE STEP BACK MANUEVER. THE TWISTS AND TURNS DURING RECENT MONTHS ON THE ISSUE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN SETTLEMENT PROCESS IS A CASE IN POINT. TWO OTHER "NEW REALITIES" RECOGNIZED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT ARE THE PROBABLE REELECTION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND THE NEW SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA REPRESENTED BY THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT DUARTE IN EL SALVADOR. I HAVE BEEN LOOKING CLOSELY FOR EVIDENCE OF CUBAN TACTICAL ADJUSTMENTS TO THESE LATTER DEVELOPMENTS BUT HAVE FOUND NOTHING. THE PENDING VISIT OF REV. JACKSON, HOWEVER, MIGHT SEEM TO SUGGEST THAT SUCH TACTICAL ADJUSTMENTS MAY BE AT HAND. TO PROBE THIS HYPOTHESIS, I MET TODAY (JUNE 13) WITH CARLOS MARTINEZ SALSAMENDI, SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO CUBAN VICE PRESIDENT CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ. HIS REMARKS INDICATE THAT WHILE THE CUBANS CONTINUE TO TRY TO CONSTRAIN THE ADMINISTRATION THROUGH THIRD PARTIES, THEY HAVE NOT BEGUN TO CONSIDER MORE SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES IN THEIR POLICIES.

4. SALSAMENDI READILY VOLUNTEERED THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT ASSESSES PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CHANCES OF REELECTION AT BETTER THAN SIXTY PER CENT. THAT ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, HAS NOT LET THEM TO CONSIDER HOW THEY MIGHT MANAGE THE BILATERAL RELATION MORE PRODUCTIVELY DURING A SECOND ADMINISTRATION. THE APPARENT REASON THAT THEY REJECT SUCH A POSSIBILITY IS THAT THEY HAVE CONCLUDED WE ARE NOT PREPARED TO ACCOMMODATE ANY OF THEIR INTERESTS. SALSAMENDI CONTRASTED THE LIKELY COURSE OF USG/SOVIET RELATIONS DURING THE NEXT FOUR YEARS WITH USG/CUBAN RELATIONS. HE SAID THAT THEY ANTICIPATE THAT FOLLOWING HIS REELECTION, PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL SEEK TO REDUCE TENSIONS THAT EXIST IN THE US/SOVIET RELATIONSHIP. THE PRESIDENT WILL DO THIS, ACCORDING TO SALSAMENDI, BOTH BECAUSE OF PRESSURE FROM US ALLIES AND FROM THE US PUBLIC, AND BECAUSE HE WILL SEE AN IMPROVEMENT IN US/SOVIET RELATIONS AS THE CAPSTONE OF HIS EIGHT YEARS IN OFFICE. AGAIN ACCORDING TO SALSAMENDI, NO SUCH PRESSURES OR DESIRES TO LEAD THE PRESIDENT TOWARDS IMPROVED RELATIONS WITH CUBA. TO THE CONTRARY, THE PRESIDENT AND HIS "TEAM" HAVE, IF ANYTHING, REVERTED RECENTLY TO THEIR INITIAL VERY HOSTILE ATTITUDE TOWARDS CUBA. ILLUSTRATING THIS ALLEGED TREND, HE POINTED TO THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 9 SPEECH WITH ITS MANY ATTACKS AGAINST CUBA. THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION IN THIS RESPECT HAS BEEN FIXED BY THE COURSE OF EVENTS AND ITS INVOLVEMENT IN CENTRAL AMERICA. HAVING REPEATEDLY ASSERTED THAT CUBA IS THE SOURCE OF CURRENT TURBULENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA, THAT IT SEEKS TO

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COMMUNIZE THE REGION AND BRING IT WITHIN THE SOVIET ORBIT AND THEREBY THREATEN THE SECURITY OF THE U.S., THE ADMINISTRATION CANNOT ALTER ITS COURSE, NOR DOES IT WANT TO. SECRETARY SHULTZ' REAFFIRMATION
FOLLOWING HIS TRIP TO NICARAGUA OF THE FOUR NECESSARY
INGREDIENTS FOR IMPROVED RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.
AND NICARAGUA IS FURTHER EVIDENCE OF USG INFLEXIBILITY.
SALSAMENDI HERE FOCUSED ON THE SECRETARY'S INSISTENCE THAT THE SANDINISTAS ELIMINATE THEIR TIES WITH CUBA AND THE SOVIETS. FOR THE CUBANS, SUCH INSISTENCE CLEARLY INDICATES THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL NOT COUNTENANCE ANY EFFORT TO IMPROVE BILATERAL RELATIONS. THIS BEING THE CASE, CUBA MUST PREPARE FOR A WORST-CASE SCENARIO, WHICH WOULD INVOLVE USG MILITARY ACTION AGAINST CUBA. THE PREPARATIONS AND THUS CUBAN POLICY VIS-A-VIS AGAINST THE US IN THE SECOND ADMINISTRATION ARE CENTERED ON IMPROVING CUBA'S DEFENSE CAPABILITIES THEREBY MAKING THE COST OF ANY US AGGRESSION UNACCEPTABLE.

5. TURNING TO THE VISIT OF REV. JACKSON, SALSAMENDI WAS LESS EXPLICIT. HE SAID THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT OBVIOUSLY HAS WELCOMED REV. JACKSON'S ANALYSIS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CRISIS. THEY UNDERSTAND, HOWEVER, THAT REV. JACKSON IS UNLIKELY TO BE ABLE TO CHANGE THE DIRECTION OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S CUBAN AND CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICIES. NEVERTHELESS, THEY WELCOME CONTACT WITH AMERICANS SUCH AS REV. JACKSON WHO SHARE VIEWS SIMILAR TO THEIR OWN. SALSAMENDI AT THIS POINT LAMENTED THE FACT THAT CUBAN/US CONTACTS DURING THE PAST THREE AND ONE-HALF YEARS, BE THEY WITH ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS OR OTHER AMERICANS, HAVE FALLEN FAR BELOW THE LEVEL THAT HELD DURING THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION. HAVING GIVEN THIS RATHER INANE EXPLANATION OF THE CUBAN INVITATION, SALSAMENDI CAME CLOSER TO WHAT IS PROBABLY THEIR TRUE PURPOSE BY SAYING THAT THE VISIT WILL BE WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN THE US AND THROUGH SUCH PUBLICITY MAY INDIRECTLY AFFECT USG POLICIES.

6. TURNING TO THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, SALSAMENDI ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ELECTION OF PRESIDENT DUARTE CONSTITUTES A NEW "REALITY" THAT MUST BE ACKNOWLEDGED. HE THEN IMMEDIATELY DISCOUNTED THE IMPORTANCE OF THAT REALITY BY ASSERTING THAT DUARTE DOES NOT REPRESENT ANY INDEPENDENT FORCE IN EL SALVADOR. HE IS A CREATURE OF US POLICY AND AS SUCH IS AN OPPORTUNIST WITHOUT PRINCIPLES. MORE TO THE POINT, DUARTE WILL NOT BE ABLE TO CONTROL THE SALVADORAN MILITARY AND THEIR ALLIES IN THE ECONOMIC ELITE OF THAT COUNTRY. AS PROOF OF HIS THESIS. FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY MOTLEY FROM JOHN A. FERCH SALSAMENDI POINTED TO DUARTE'S "FLIP-FLOP" REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUERRILLAS. WHEREAS DURING HIS ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN DUARTE INDICATED THAT HE WOULD

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NEGOTIATE WITH THE GUERRILLAS, HE NOW RULES OUT THAT POSSIBILITY. ALTHOUGH ACKNOWLEDGING THAT DUARTE'S FIRST TASK IS TO ESTABLISH HIS ADMINISTRATION AND THUS HE CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS POINT IN TIME, SALSAMENDI ARGUED THAT DUARTE DID NOT HAVE TO CLOSE HIS OPTIONS REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS. WHEN THE GUERRILLAS OFFERED TO ENTER INTO TALKS, DUARTE COULD HAVE KEPT HIS SILENCE. HE DID NOT HAVE TO RULE OUT TALKS "WHILE GUNS ARE ON THE TABLE." BY RULING OUT TALKS, DUARTE REVEALED BOTH HIS SUBSERVIENCE TO THE MILITARY AND THE FALSITY OF US CLAIMS THAT IT DOES NOT SEEK A MILITARY SOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR. BECAUSE DUARTE IS IN EFFECT A FICTION AND BECAUSE THE GUERRILLAS CONSTITUTE A MILITARY/POLITICAL REALITY, THEY CANNOT BE IGNORED OR PUSHED ASIDE. THE ELECTION OF DUARTE THUS CANNOT BE CONSIDERED TO BE A "SIGNIFICANT" NEW DEVELOPMENT.

7. COMMENT: I READ FROM SALSAMENDI'S REMARKS THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET COME TO GRIPS WITH THE PROBLEM POSED BY A SECOND REAGAN ADMINISTRATION THAT IS DETERMINED TO SUSTAIN ITS CURRENT POLICIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA. FOR THE MOMENT, THEREFORE, THE CUBANS ARE STANDING PAT. THE INVITATION TO REV. JACKSON DOES NOT CONSTITUTE ANY TACTICAL DEPARTURE FROM THE STANCE THEY HAVE HELD FOR THE PAST TEN MONTHS. RATHER, THEY ARE SIMPLY SEIZING AN OPPORTUNITY TO TRY TO BUILD PRESSURE WITHIN THE US AGAINST THE ADMINISTRATION'S CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICIES. IN THIS SENSE THE INVITATION DOES NOT DIFFER SIGNIFICANTLY FROM CASTRO'S EFFORTS EARLIER THIS YEAR TO CONVINCE OPPONENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THEY SHOULD UNITE TO PREVENT THE USG FROM INTERVENING MILITARILY IN CENTRAL AMERICA. I, THEREFORE, EXPECT CASTRO DURING THE VISIT TO ATTEMPT TO CONTRAST THE ADMINISTRATION'S ALLEGED INTRANSIGENCE IN THE REGION WITH CUBA'S FLEXIBILITY. HE WILL BEMOAN THE ADMINISTRATION'S INABILITY TO UNDERSTAND THE ROOTS OF THE CENTRAL AMERICAN CRISIS AND EXPOUND UPON HIS OWN VISION OF AN INDIGENOUS UPRISING AGAINST SOCIAL/POLITICAL REPRESSION. WE WILL HEAR MUCH ABOUT THE NEED TO COMBAT POVERTY AND TO PERMIT THE CENTRAL AMERICANS TO UNDERTAKE THE PROFOUND SOCIAL/POLITICAL REFORMS THEY DESIRE. USG SECURITY CONCERNS WILL BE DISMISSED AS A FIGMENT OF ITS PARANOIA.

8. IN USING THE VISIT TO REINFORCE AMONG OPPONENTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION THIS VERSION OF CONVENTIONAL WISDOM, CASTRO WILL FACE TWO PROBLEMS. FIRST, IF HE LETS HIS PERSONAL ANTIPATHY TOWARDS PRESIDENT REAGAN SHOW, HIS REMARKS IN THIS CONTEXT COULD WELL BACKFIRE, EVEN AMONG CONVINCED OPPONENTS OF OUR CENTRAL AMERICAN POLICY. SECOND,

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HE WILL HAVE TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT THE CONTADORA PROCESS BUT AT THE SAME TIME AVOID BEING PINNED DOWN ON THE SPECIFICS OF THAT PROCESS. HE WILL OBVIOUSLY TRY TO SIDESTEP THE ISSUES OF VERIFICATION AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT IN NICARAGUA. IF HE SLIPS AND ASSERTS, AS THE SANDINISTAS ON OCCASION HAVE, THAT THOSE ISSUES CONSTITUTE AN UNJUSTIFIED INTERVENTION IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF NICARAGUA AND THUS INFRINGE UPON ITS SOVEREIGNTY, HE ALSO RISKS A PUBLIC RELATIONS BACKFIRE. CASTRO IS AN ASTUTE ENOUGH POLITICIAN AND THUS PROBABLY WILL NOT SLIP. HOW, THEREFORE, CAN WE PUSH HIM CLOSER TO THAT POSSIBILITY? OBVIOUSLY, DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCES(S) THAT HE IS LIKELY TO HAVE DURING THE VISIT, SOME JOURNALIST MIGHT BE WILLING TO PIN HIM DOWN AND FORCE AN EXPLICIT STATEMENT OF THE CUBAN POSITION ON VERIFICATION AND PLURALISM IN NICARAGUA. SIMILARLY, PROPER QUESTIONING COULD REVEAL THE HOLLOWNESS OF THE CUBAN STAND ON CONTADORA.

9. FOR THE RECORD, MY APPROACH IN THIS CONVERSATION WAS TO THROW OUT SUBJECT MATTER AND LET SALSAMENDI TALK. BECAUSE I WAS SEEKING HIS VIEWS, I SOUGHT TO AVOID A DEBATE. THUS, I SIMPLY SAID AT THOSE POINTS WHERE OUR ANALYSES DIFFERED OR HIS INTERPRETATIONS OF OUR POLICY ERRED FROM THE FACTS, THAT I DISAGREED. AT NO POINT DID HE QUERY ME.

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MSGNO 1 (STXX) 438 *12/06/84* *12:51*
 ZCZC 14:44:57Z (ST)

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STATE

ACTIONS: NONE INFO: ALA/CR-2, ALA/ES-2, ALA/G-2, ALA/H-2,
 ALA/MC/L, ALA/MC/F1, ALA/MC/M1, ALA/MC/M2, ALA/MC/PM, ALA/MC/PMF,
 ALA/MC/A, ALA/MC/RAF, ALA/N-2, ALA/P-2, ALA/PC/LA, ODPG-G, ODPH-H,
 ODPH-N, ODPH-S, ODPH-W, OGI/GD/AH, OGI/IIC/IB, OGI/TAB1, OGI/TAB2,
 OGI/FR, OPCR/EALA, PLANFAC-E (), RF, SOV/CS, SOV/CS/CA, SOV/CS/S/M,
 SOV/PA/L, SOV/SFD, TF-E (), FILE, LA/CATF-3, LA/RP, C/IAO, CR/WH,
 PC/LA, IADSEG-3, ICS/4C/LA, NICAG/LA, NIC/FH/AL, NTO/LA, OIA/TWSS,
 SAG/PFB-2, STD/PPC, (19/4)
 A2G-2, A2I-2, A2K-2, A2L-2, A2R, A2S, A2U, A2V, A30, A3N, A2W, A2X,
 A3F-2, A3D-2, APC, S44, S6D, S6E, S6F, S4F.

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FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA

TO RUEML/SECSTATE WAS4DC IMMEDIATE 1056

INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

PUFHOL/AMEMBASSY RONN #2

RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 350

RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 295

RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 461

RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY POMF 54R

RUDKFSQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 098

RUDKGPQ/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 084

RUECEHA/USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

PT

EZ1:

UNCLAS MANAGUA 3159

EZ2:

EO 12350: N/A

TAGS: PAEL, PGOV, NU, US

SUBJ: ORTEGA CALLS US INTEREST IN NEGOTIATIONS "PROPAGANDA"

1. JUNTA COORDINATOR DANIEL ORTEGA, SPEAKING TO A PRESS
 CONFERENCE JUNE 9, CHARGED THAT THE U.S. HAD LAUNCHED A
 MILITARY CAMPAIGN WHOSE END WAS A "SUPPOSED NEGOTIATION" WHICH
 WOULD RESULT IN THE "CRIPPLING OF NICARAGUA, THE "SURRENDER"
 OF THE GRN AND AN END TO THE FSLN REVOLUTION. ORTEGA, ACCORDING
 TO PARRACADA JUNE 11, SAID THE ADMINISTRATION'S INTEREST IN
 NEGOTIATIONS WAS "ONLY A PROPAGANDA ELEMENT...TO COVER ANY
 FLANK NOT COVERED" BY U.S. AGGRESSION. HE ADDED THAT THE U.S.
 "HAS BEEN OBLIGED" TO APPEAR TO BE IN FAVOR OF DIALOGUE BECAUSE
 OF CONGRESSIONAL EFFORTS TO DISMANTLE U.S. AID TO THE ARMED
 COUNTERREVOLUTION.

2. PARRACADA ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT "ORTEGA INDICATED THAT NICA-
 RAGUA CANNOT LOSE HOPE THAT CONGRESSIONAL PRESSURES WILL OBLIGE
 WASHINGTON TO ENTER INTO DIALOGUE WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK PROPOSED
 BY OUR GOVERNMENT. THAT IS, WITHIN A FRAMEWORK OF MUTUAL
 RESPECT."

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C O N F I D E N T I A L

12 Jun 84

MSGAC 24 (STX4) A3E *12/06/84* *02:52*
 ZCZC 07:50:422 (ST)

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STATE

ACTION: NONE INFO: ALA/CF-2, ALA/ES-2, ALA/G-2, ALA/HQ-2,
 ALA/MC/D, ALA/MC/E1, ALA/PC/M1, ALA/MC/M2, ALA/MC/PM, ALA/MC/PME,
 ALA/MC/R, ALA/MC/RAE, ALA/N-2, ALA/P-2, ALA/PO/LA, CRJ, ODPH-H, ODPN-A,
 ODPS-S, ODPH-2, OGI/IIC/IB, OPCTR/FALA, PLANFAC-E (), RF, SCV/CS/S/M,
 SCV/CS/Y, SOV/FA/S, TF-E (), FILE, LA/CATF-3, LA/RR, C/IAD, CI/OC,
 D/OCF-3, EPC/LA, NICAG/LA, NIO/FH/AL, NIO/LA, OIA/TJSS, SAG/FPB-2,
 STD/FFC, 41R/W)
 A2G-2, A2I-2, A2K-2, A2N-2, A2B, A2S, A2U, A2V, A30, A3N, A2W, A2X,
 A3E-2, A3D-2, ABC, S6D,

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 TO RUE+C/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1848
 INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
 BT

EZ1:

C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 3148

EXDIS

EZ2:

DEPT FASS USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PN

EO 12356 : DECL: CADR

TAGS : FREL NU US

SUBJ : CR1 OFFICIAL ON SHLAUDEMAN-TINOCO TALKS

REF : A) MANAGUA 2768; B) MANAGUA 3082; C) PANAGUA 3071;
 C) MANAGUA 3123

1. RAMON MENESES, IN CHARGE OF NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS FOR THE FSLN'S DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (DRI), CONFIRMED JUNE 9 IN A CONVERSATION WITH THE POLCOUNS THAT THERE WAS A GOOD DEAL OF SKEPTICISM WITHIN THE FSLN OVER U.S. MOTIVES FOR PROPOSING THE SHLAUDEMAN-TINOCO TALKS. HE TOLD DCM SEPARATELY AND POLCOUNS THAT HE PERSONALLY HAD ARGUED STRENUOUSLY IN FSLN COUNCILS THAT THE GRN "TAKE THE TALKS SERIOUSLY" AS THE BEST HOPE THE TWO SIDES HAD TO AVOID A MILITARY CONFRONTATION CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF THE WHOLE REGION. HE IMPLIED THAT HE HAD NOT FOUND MANY SUPPORTERS FOR HIS VIEWS.

2. IN FURTHER DISCUSSION WITH POLCOUNS MENESES SAID THAT THE TALKS, IF THEY ARE TO SUCCEED, MUST GO BEYOND YET ANOTHER REPETITION OF VIEWS. EACH SIDE MUST DISCUSS CONCRETE STEPS AND SHOW IT WAS WILLING TO TAKE THEM. HE SAID THE GRN, FOR ITS PART, WAS READY TO DO SO. HE SAID THE NICARAGUAN DELEGATION TO THE TALKS HAD ALREADY BEEN CHOSEN: TINOCO, ARMY CHIEF OF INTELLIGENCE JULIO RAPOS, AND MINISTRY OF EXTERIOR NORTH AMERICAN DEPARTMENT CHIEF SALL ARANA.

3. POLCOUNS OFFERED OPINION THAT THE FSLN POLICY STATEMENT ISSUED MAY 18 DURING THE SANDINISTA ASSEMBLY (REF A) AND

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MSGNO 24 (STXX) A3B *12/06/84* *02:52*
ITS JUNE 5 STATEMENT ON STRATEGY AGAINST THE COUNTERREVOLU-
TION (REF B) INDICATED THAT THE NATIONAL DIRECTORATE HAD
MADE SOME IMPORTANT DECISIONS ON NATIONAL POLICY IN COMING
MONTHS. MENESES AGREED, OFFERING THE INTERPRETATION THAT
THE STATEMENTS WERE INTENDED TO PREPARE THE NATION BOTH FOR
FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON PEACE AND FOR THE EVENTUALITY THAT
THOSE NEGOTIATIONS MIGHT FAIL. POLCOUNS SAID THE POLICY
LINE THE STATEMENTS HAD TAKEN WAS A VERY TOUGH ONE. MENESES
REPLIED THAT THE LINE WAS NECESSARY UNDER PRESENT CONDITIONS.
4. COMMENT: FSLN SKEPTICISM OVER NEGOTIATIONS AT THIS
STAGE WITH THE U.S. IS BEING EXPRESSED PUBLICLY, AS WE HAVE
REPORTED REFS C AND D. BY SEPTEL WE ARE REPORTING FURTHER
PUBLIC REMARKS BY DANIEL ORTEGA JUNE 10 THAT THE U.S. VIEW
OF NEGOTIATION WITH THE GRN IS THE LATER'S SURRENDER.
BEPGOLD

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FRP: .2, .4, . . . ,8

STATE

ACTION: NONE - INFO: FILE, RF, ALA/CR-2, ALA/ES-2, ALA/G-2,
 ALA/HO-2, ALA/MC/D, ALA/MC/E1, ALA/MC/EP, ALA/MC/M1, ALA/MC/M2,
 ALA/MC/R, ALA/MC/RAE, ALA/N-2, ALA/P-2, ALA/PO/LA, CR/WH, EPO/LA,
 ICS/MC/LA, LA/CATF-3, NICAG/LA, NIO/FH/AL, NIO/LA, ODPN-N, ODPS-S,
 OGI/IIC/IB, QIA/TWSS, DPCTR/EALA, SAG/PPB-2, TF-E,

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 FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1197
 INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE
 BT
 C O N F I D E N T I A L MANAGUA 3361

EO 12356 : DECL : OADR
 TAGS : PREL NU US
 SUBJ : TINOCO, DRI OFFICIAL ON US/NICARAGUAN RELATIONS

1. (U) VICE FOREIGN MINISTER VICTOR HUGO TINOCO SAID ON JUNE 20 THAT THE US WAS USING A NEW TACTIC IN ITS RELATIONS WITH NICARAGUA BUT ADDED THE NOW STANDARD CHARGE THAT ITS ATTITUDE HAD NOT CHANGED. SPEAKING AT A FOREIGN MINISTRY SYMPOSIUM ON "NORTH AMERICAN POLICY IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN REGION AND THE CARIBBEAN", TINOCO ASSERTED THAT THE US WAS NOW COMBINING A NEW POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC ELEMENT WITH ITS MILITARY EFFORTS IN ITS WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA. HE DESCRIBED RECENT U/NICARAGUAN RELATIONS AS BEING CHARACTERIZED BY THE US'S EFFORTS TO IMPOSE CONDITIONS ON NICARAGUA AND BLOCK THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS. THE REVOLUTION'S STRENGTH HAD COMPELLED THE US TO USE MERCENARIES AND OTHER POLICIES TO BRING THE REVOLUTION TO ITS KNEES, HE CLAIMED. HOWEVER, THREE YEARS OF WAR HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT A REVOLUTION WHICH HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE WOULD NOT SUBMIT TO "CONDITIONS". MOREOVER, THE WAR HAD CREATED POLITICAL AND DIPLOMATIC PROBLEMS FOR THE US. THE US WAS THEREFORE MODIFYING ITS POLICY TO LOWER THE COSTS OF THOSE POLICIES. THE NEW POLICY WAS ALSO AIMED AT MAKING IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR

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NICARAGUA TO CONFRONT THE WAR. TINOCO CONCLUDED BY COMMENTING THAT THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION WAS CHANGING ITS STYLE IN AN ELECTION YEAR, INTRODUCING THIS POLITICAL-DIPLOMATIC ELEMENT WHICH COULD HELP CREATE CONDITIONS MORE FAVORABLE TO ITS ENDS; HE WARNED ALSO THAT THESE CONDITIONS COULD BE INTENDED TO SET THE STAGE FOR NEW MILITARY ATTACKS LATER ON.

2. (C) COMMENT: TINOCO'S REMARKS DEMONSTRATE THE EXTREME SKEPTICISM WITHIN THE RANKS OF THE FSLN ABOUT US MOTIVES. ON JUNE 20, LEONEL PALACIOS, A LOW LEVEL OFFICIAL IN THE FSLN'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS DEPARTMENT (DRI), TOLD POLOFF THAT HIS COLLEAGUES WERE CONCERNED THAT THE US INTENDED TO STRING OUT THE SHLAUDEMAN-TINOCO DISCUSSIONS AND ULTIMATELY INSIST ON CONDITIONS WHICH THE FSLN WOULD HAVE TO REJECT. PALACIOS ADDED THAT THE PREVAILING OPINION IN THE FSLN WAS THAT THE SECRETARY'S TRIP AND THE PROPOSED DIALOGUE WERE MERELY ELECTION-YEAR POLITICS AND NOT INTENDED TO ACHIEVE RESULTS; THE REAL US OBJECTIVE, THEY FEARED, WAS TO DECEIVE THE WORLD INTO BELIEVING THE US WAS MAKING AN EARNEST EFFORT AT NEGOTIATIONS AND THEN, WHEN THE TALKS BROKE DOWN, TO ARGUE THAT IT HAD NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO RESORT TO MILITARY PRESSURE.

BERGOLD

END OF MESSAGE

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